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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The lower court erred when it ruled (1) various misrepresentations made by the 
Appellants constituted fraud, (2) that prejudgement interest ran from the time of Appellee's 
investment, and (3) that the Appellants did not meet the appropriate burden of proof 
regarding offsets.1 In making these determinations, the trial Court relied heavily on a 
Stipulation entered into in open court by the parties. The Stipulation was not applied 
appropriately, given the understanding of the parties. Because the trial court relied on a 
stipulation in making its ruling, this court should review the trial court's conclusions under 
a correction of error standard. Further, the trial court awarded pre-judgment interest to the 
Appellee. However, where damages are incomplete, and are not fixed, prejudgment interest 
is inappropriate. In this case, the lack of certainty precludes prejudgment interest. 
ARGUMENT 
I. OBJECTIONS TO APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Appellee is incorrect in stating that Appellant's have "failed to provide either: (1) 
applicable standards of review; or (2) a citation to the record showing that each issue was 
preserved at the trial court."2 For each of Appellee's assertions regarding the Statement of 
1
 See Record, 1347-1353. 
2
 See Brief of Appellee, page 1. 
Appellants' Reply Brief- 2 
Issues, the Appellants respond as follows: 
A. Correct standard of review. Appellee's arguments contained in its Brief of 
Appellee either supports his own position, or mis-characterizes the proper standard of review. 
(1) Appellee supports Appellants9 position. Appellee's Brief, page 1, Issue 
(1) states that the correct standard of review when applying prejudgment interest "presents 
a question of law which is reviewed for correctness." This supports Appellants' position. 
Appellee's Brief states the following: 
A "[t]rial court's decision to grant or deny prejudgment interest presents a 
question of law which the Supreme Court reviews for correctness. The 
standard or review for this issue, then, is the correction of error standard, with 
no deference to conclusions made by the trial court." Correctness means that 
the appellate court decides the matter for itself and does not defer in any 
degree to the trial judge's determination of law.3 
It is unclear why Appellee would assert that Appellants' position is incorrect, and then 
provide for its support. 
(2) Appellee mis-characterizes the appropriate standard of review. 
Appellee mis-characterizes the proper standard of review in a case where a trial court must 
rely upon stipulated facts to decide a case. Issues presented in the Brief of Appellee, pages 
1 to 3, entitled Issues 2, 3 and 4, fall under this category. Appellee argues that these issues 
are to be decided under a "clearly erroneous" standard. However, this standard is incorrect 
where a trial judge decides a case by applying a stipulation. In Bess v. Jensen, this Court 
3
 See Brief of Appellants' Brief, page 18. 
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stated: 
When a trial court relies on stipulated facts to decide a case, the appellate 
court does not apply the clearly erroneous standard, but will sustain the 
lower court's decision only if convinced of its correctness (emphasis 
added).4 
Appellee states in pages 1 to 3, entitled Issues 2,3, and 4, that a "clearly erroneous" standard 
applies where a trial court (a) used an incorrect stipulated percentage, (b) misapplied a 
stipulation entered into by the litigants, and (c) inconsistently excluded certain costs 
presented within a stipulation during the course of a trial. Where a stipulation is entered into 
during a trial, and that stipulation is used in determining the outcome of the case, the proper 
standard of review is clearly one of "correctness." 
B. Preserving issues on appeal. Appellee asserts that Appellants failed to cite 
to the record preserving each issue for appeal.5 Other than the allegation, however, Appellee 
does not address the issue in his Brief. The assertion is without merit. The Appellants, by 
objecting to the trial Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law, preserved those issues 
discussed for review by an appellate court. The Appellants filed on February 6, 1998 its 
Defendants' Objections to Plaintiffs 1/19/98 Revised Proposed Findings Of Fact And 
4
 Bess v. Jensen, 782 P.2d 542, 544 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). See also Knight v. Post, 748 P.2d 1097(Utah 
App. 1988); Estate ofWolfinger v. Wolfinger, 793 P.2d 393 (Utah App. 1990); Sacrameto Baseball Club, Inc. v. 
Great Northern Baseball Co., 748 P.2d (Utah 1987); Hansen v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 931 (Utah App. 1998), State 
Ace. Ins. Fund Corp. v. Casteel, 719 P.2d 853 (Oregon 1986) md Roll Form Products, Inc. v. State Ins. Fund, 733 
P.2d 426. (Okla. App. 1987). 
5
 See Brief of Appellee, page 1. 
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Conclusions of Law.6 The Objection contains detailed exceptions to nearly all findings of 
fact and conclusions of law addressed by the Court, including misuse of the Stipulation.7 In 
fact, the Utah Supreme Court has ruled that failure to object to trial findings of fact is not 
fatal to appellant review.8 Regardless, by objecting to the judgment, Appellant has preserved 
its right to appeal those issues raised in its Objections. 
II. REPLY TO APPELLEE'S § I - PREJUDGMENT INTEREST. 
A. Damages could not be determined with "mathematical accuracy" 
To compute the amount to which Appellee was entitled, it was necessary for the 
Court to: (1) determine the profit earned on the Las Vegas Project; and (2) to compute the 
"proportional interest" of each of the parties in that project, and to then allocate the profit 
between them according to their "proportional interests" [Ex. 9]. The accounting experts for 
each side spent in excess of 100 hours attempting to reconstruct and piece together multiple 
business transactions over a period of about 15 years, in an effort to determine and arrive at 
their summaries and conclusions.9 Appellee's expert testified that old accounting records and 
supporting documents for the various entities involved in the transactions were generally 
6




 See Dugan v. Jones, 724 P.2d 955(Utah 1986). See also, Howard v. Howard, 601 P.2d 931 (Utah 
1979). However, other courts have found this to be fatal. See In re Marriage ofLaster, 643 P.2d 597(Mont. 
1982). 
9
 Tr. 303. 
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non-existent, that he was unable to trace individual transactions on a daily or yearly basis, 
and that he primarily relied on data from income tax returns.10 
B. Appellee's expert's conclusions - Ex, 126 [app. 2] 
In his "Summary Analysis" Ex. 125,11 Appellee's expert lists: (a) five basic 
assumptions he made, and (b) eight notes which explain the problems he experienced in 
obtaining information, the incomplete nature of the records, the sources upon which he 
relied, etc., to create his accounting summary, Ex 126.12 
Ex. 12613 summarizes appellee's expert's financial conclusions. The top half of his 
last page summarizes the information he assembled, and the bottom half uses two alterative 
methods in an effort to compute the amount owed to Appellee. In his "Total Basis Method" 
he concluded that Appellee was owed not less than $160,530.66, and in his "Total Proceeds 
Method" that the amount was owed $306,156.50. Appellee's expert concludes that there is 
a difference of $145,616 in the amount owed, depending upon which accounting method 
used. 
Assumptions by Appellee's expert materially affected his conclusions. For example, 
See Tr. 304 and discussion in f 5, P. 12 & FN 70, P. 41 of Appellants' Opening Brief-
Copy attached as Appendix 1. 
Copy attached as Appendix 2. 
Copy attached as Appendix 2. 
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in computing Appellants' investment, he excluded option payments for purchase the Las 
Vegas property, which he assumed might have offset (he treated it as a "Wash") the option 
payments.14 Had he included those option payments, Appellee's "proportionate share" and 
the amount owed would have been "proportionately" less. The same is true as to each 
assumption or conclusion made by the experts in an effort to sort out the confusion resulting 
from hundreds of transactions over a 15 year period, missing and inadequate records, etc. 
C. Experts' stipulation - Ex. 140 
Mid-trial the experts met, compromised and settled many items and amounts, left 
seven remaining disputed items for the Court to decide, and reduced their agreement to a 
schedule, Ex. 140.15 The parties stipulated to Ex. 140. Some additional explanation of Ex. 
140 is given in the footnote to assist the Court in understanding this complex accounting 
summary.16 
14
 Tr. 362-363. 
15
 Copy attached as Appendix "D" to Appellant's opening brief. A copy of Appellants' expert's 
explanation of Ex. 140 [Tr. 597-610] is attached as Appendix 3. 
16
 Further explanation of Ex. 140 
The stipulated items and amounts, which make up the $665,019 difference between the amount of Appellants' investment 
as shown on L. (3), Col. (b) and (c) of Ex. 140, include Appellants' land purchase commissions of $101,519.44 [L. (16) and their 
cost of buying DuBois, Daines & Nelson's 60% of entity that owned the Las Vegas land, L. (17) & (18)]. If all three items are 
included as part of Appellants' cost, then Appellee's share of proceeds is 3.49%, if they are all excluded his share is %5.27, and 
if some but not all are excluded, his share is some percentage between those numbers. As Appellants' "proportionate share" 
increases, Appellees "proportionate share" decreases. 
To assist the Court, in lines (11), (12) and (13), the experts computed the net dollar effect on the amount owed, depending 
upon whether we include or exclude the land purchase commissions and costs of purchasing the other 60% of the entity which 
owned the Las Vegas Land. For example, if the $101,519.44 paid by Appellants for land purchase commissions [Ex. 140, P. 2, 
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D. Comparison of Ex. 140 with expert's Ex. 126 shows uncertainty 
Comparison of Appellee's expert's conclusions in Ex. 126 [app.2] with the stipulated 
conclusions in Ex. 140 demonstrates some of the substantial differences which existed before 
the stipulation. But for the stipulation, each of those ten disputed items would have been 
decided by the Court after hearing disputed evidence, which dispute precludes award of 
prejudgment interest. The $82,818 net difference between income and costs shown in Ex. 
12617 and 140 are as follows: 
1. Ex. 140 added $70,685 to the selling price shown in Ex. 126.18 
2. Ex. 140 added $20,758 to the property cost shown in Ex. 126.19 
3. Ex. 140 added eight items of property acquisition costs to those shown in Ex. 
126, which increased the land cost by $132,745.20 
E. Interest award from time certainty exists 
Appellee's brief incorrectly argues that because this is a breach of contract action, it 
L. 16] is included as part of Appellants' investment to determine their "proportionate share," then the amount owed to Appellee 
is reduced by $8,596 [Ex. 140, P. 1, L. 11]. The $56,311 difference between the $103,406 on L. (1), Col. (b) and the $159,717 
on L. (1), Col. (c), is the total of the items shown in L. (11), (12) and (13). 
Also see discussion in f E, P. 45-48 & FN 88, P. 47 of Appellants' opening brief, including math error which overstated 
Appellee's "proportionate share." 
17
 Copy attached as Appendix 2. 
18
 Copy attached as Appendix 2, L. (2), P. 2, Ex. 140. 
19
 Copy attached as Appendix 2, L. (5), P. 2, Ex. 140. 
20
 Copy attached as Appendix 2, L. (6) thru (14), P. 2, Ex. 140. 
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must follow that damages are calculable with mathematical accuracy.21 Appellee incorrectly 
argues that even if the stipulation was a compromise, there were no disputed factual issues 
which would preclude prejudgment interest. By its very nature, a compromise presupposes 
a pre-existing dispute. His argument is sheer speculation. Among other things, he somehow 
concludes (without citing facts) that (P. 23): 
"damages were so clearly calculable with mathematical 
certainty that the accounting experts from both side were able 
to agree to the specific dollar amounts which would be used 
to determine the damages based on the trial court's factual 
findings." 
The compromise did result in specific dollar amounts to be used to compute damages, 
but it did not change the disputed and uncertain nature of the dispute that was compromised 
by the stipulation. 
Appellee incorrectly assumes that, because the accountants' reports contain specific 
dollar amounts, accounting is an exact science, and if the stipulation had not been made, both 
accountants would have reached the same conclusions.22 Prior to the stipulation, the experts 
had reached very different conclusions. The Court may take judicial notice of the fact that 
CPAs are professionals, and their work involves the exercise of judgment and discretion.23 
21
 Appellees' brief, P. 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 27, 28, 29, et seq. 
22
 P. 37 in Appellee's brief. 
23
 Appellee's assertion that the expert's conclusions "were arrived at by generally accepted accounting 
conventions" [P. 19] shows a lack of knowledge as to "generally accepted accounting principles," and of the 
function of accountants. There simply are not "generally accepted" accounting principles for reconstructing 
Appellants' Reply Brief- 9 
Appellee's assertion that Ex. 140 was not a compromise between the accountants is untrue. 
The fact the accountants agreed on which of several methods to use, falls far short of 
implying that Ex. 140 was not a compromise.24 Appellants agree that the mathematical 
uncertainty ceased to exist when the parties stipulated to Ex. 140, and that interest could 
accrue from that time, but disagrees with Appellee's unfounded conclusion that this means 
retroactive interest could accrue prior to that time. 
F. Type of contract claim affects mathematical certainty 
If this were a suit on a promissory note where the original amount of the debt was 
certain, the interest rate was fixed, and there was a dispute as to what payments had been 
made, the trial court could properly rule as to the date and amount of each payment. The 
finder of fact could then easily compute the unpaid balance with mathematical accuracy. 
Prejudgment interest would be proper. 
Unlike that type of case, our accountants were required to repeatedly exercise their 
professional judgment concerning multiple transactions over a 15 year period from 
financial transactions from inadequate records. Such circumstances call for the utmost skill and judgment of a 
professional accountant. While different Bookkeepers summarizing a group of checks might arrive at essentially 
the same conclusion, what we are dealing with has little resemblance to a bookkeeper's function. Before 
information summarized by a bookkeeper can be put into the form of a financial statement, the records must be 
complete, and an accountant must exercise his professional knowledge concerning a variety of matters so the 
statements will show the true financial condition of the business. What we are dealing with in this case does not 
even come close to the usual accountant's function of preparing a financial statement. Many Certified Public 
Accountants would take offense to Appellee's attempt to strip them from exercising their professional knowledge, 
judgment and discretion. 
24
 See argument in Appellee's footnote 5, P. 19-20 of Appellee's brief herein. 
Appellants' Reply Brief - 10 
incomplete information. The mid-trial stipulation which made it unnecessary for the Court 
to decide those many issues does not change the basis fact that before the stipulation damages 
were not mathematically calculable without substantial exercise of discretion by the fact 
finder. In Bjork15 the Utah Supreme Court held that: 
If sufficient certainty exists, courts should allow interest 
from the time when damages become fixed rather than from 
the date of the judgment. (Emphasis added). 
Application of Bjork to our facts requires that interest commence at the time the 
stipulation made computation of damages sufficiently certain to compute them with 
mathematical certainty, without the Court being required to make decisions regarding 
disputed facts based on the trial court's best judgment. 
Ex. 140 reserved seven disputes for the trial court to resolve, and gave a specific 
dollar amount to increase the minimum damage award for each of those items resolved in 
favor of defendants. After the stipulation, there was sufficient certainty to award interest 
from that time forward. No interest should be awarded prior to that date. 
G. Allocation of profit required exercise of judgment 
Appellee's expert assumed that the profit from each of the three primary property 
sales was proportionately the same, and retroactively allocated the profit back to each sale 
for purposes of computing interest. That exercise of judgment, by itself, precludes 
25
 Bjork v. April Industries (Utah 1977) 560 P.2d 315, 317. See quotation and discussion on P. 19 of 
Appellants' Opening Brief herein. 
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prejudgment interest. 
H. "Proportionate" profits cannot be calculated with mathematical certainty 
The "proportionate share" of proceeds from the Las Vegas Project to which each part 
is entitled is computed on lines (5) [percentage share] and (10) [dollar share]. On L. 3, Col. 
(a) is the $2,105,387 which Appellants claim to be their cost, and in Col. (c) is the undisputed 
$1,440,368 of those costs. On P. 2, L. (4) thru (14) of Ex. 140 is listed the items and 
amounts which make up the $1,440,368 of Appellants' undisputed costs [P. 1, L. (3), Col. 
(c)]. 
The underlying contract gave Appellants and Appellee each a "proportional interest" 
[Ex. 9] in the Las Vegas Properties. By reason of the need to try to reconstruct financial 
transactions which occurred over a 15 year period from inadequate and missing records, 
determination of the respective parties' "proportional interests" has not been, and cannot be, 
calculated with mathematical accuracy in accordance with well established rules of 
damages.26 The court erred in awarding prejudgment interest to Appellee. 
26
 F.D.I.C. v Oldenburg, 34 F.3D 1529 (1994, 10th Cir. 1529), which applied Utah Law. Andreason v. 
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., (Utah App. 1993), 848 P.2d 171, which held that: 
the damages must be calculable through mathematically certain procedure allowing court or 
jury to fix amount by following fixed rules of evidence and known standards of value, rather 
than being guided by their best judgment in assessing amount or evaluation elements lacking 
fixed 
standards by which to measure their value. (Emphasis added). 
See also U. S. Industries, Inc. v. Touche Ross & Co., (CA 10 Utah 1988), 854 F. 2d 1223; Shoreline Development, 
Inc. v. Utah County, (Utah App. 1992), 835 P.2d 207, which held that: 
Appellants' Reply Brief- 12 
I. Utah Foam Products 
In Utah Foam Products,21 with strikingly similar facts, prejudgment interest was not 
allowed because, as is true in our case, damages could not be calculated with certainty. In 
Utah Foam, supra, the jury had to determine the damages from conflicting evidence 
concerning adjustments in price, had to choose between inconsistent methods, assumptions, 
etc. In a like manner, but for the stipulation, the Court would have been required to select 
between competing accounting methods, to have decided whether multiple transactions 
should be considered, and in what amounts, etc. The Court erred in awarding prejudgment 
interest to Appellee in the present case. 
J. "Proportional shares" of Las Vegas Project cannot be computed with 
"mathematical accuracy" 
As discussed above, and in Appellants' Opening Brief, the agreement gave each party 
a "proportional interest" in the Las Vegas Project, as it was necessary to determine each 
party's "proportional interest" to determine amounts owed to Appellee. This included a 
the determining factor in awarding prejudgment interest is whether damages upon which 
interest is sought can be calculated with mathematical certainty. (Emphasis added). 
In Bjork v. April Industries, Inc., (Utah 1997), 560 P.2d 315 the Court held: 
where damages are incomplete or cannot be calculated with mathematical accuracy,... the 
amount of the damage must be ascertained and assessed by the trier of the fact at trial, and in 
such cases prejudgment interest is not allowed. (Emphasis added). 
See discussion in f 6, P. 31-34 of Appellants' opening brief herein. 
27
 Utah Foam Products Co. v. Upjohn Co. (D. Utah 1996), 930 F. Supp. 513, affirmed 154 F.3d 1212. 
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determination of whether Appellee owned a "proportional interest" in 40% or 100% of 
Appellants' interest in the Las Vegas Project. 
Appellee's expert concluded that Bertoch and Poulson owned 40%, Daines and 
Nelson owned 40% and DuBois owned 20% of Richards Street, the entity which owned the 
Las Vegas Property.28 Appellee did not talk with any of those persons to verify or challenge 
Appellants' undisputed testimony and supporting documents, including cancelled checks, etc. 
which established Appellants' investment in the Las Vegas Project. Instead, without 
supporting evidence, Appellee's expert simply "kicked out" Appellants' cost of acquiring the 
other 60% of that entity because he allegedly had "a reasonable doubt" about the purpose of 
those payments.29 The Court accepted those unsupported conclusions, and disallowed 
Appellants' cost of acquiring the other 60% of the Las Vegas Project when it computed their 
"proportionate interest" to divide profits. [Ex. 140, L. (12) & (13)]. Yet the Court curiously 
gave Appellee a share of that 60%, as if those costs had not been incurred by Appellee.30 
2
* Record 378-79. 
29
 Record 373-378. 
30
 For example, Appellee's expert testified that he believed that commissions of $121,797 paid by 
Appellants for the purchase of the Las Vegas Properties were included as part of Appellees' investment in the Las 
Vegas Property (Tr. 379, L. 21), yet the Court did not include those commissions as part of Appellants' investment 
to compute their proportionate share of the Las Vegas Project [Ex. 140, L. (11)]. As a result of excluding those 
expenses and Appellants' $563,500 cost of acquiring 60% of the Las Vegas Property from others [P. 2, L (17) & 
(18) of Ex. 140], only 40% of Appellants' investment in the Las Vegas Project was considered by the Court when 
it determined each party's "proportionate share" of the Las Vegas Project. As a result the share of profit awarded 
by the Court to Appellee was overstated by about 60%. 
Appellants' Reply Brief'- 14 
Appellee cannot have it both ways. If Appellants' cost of acquiring the other 60% of 
Richards street (which owned the Las Vegas Property) are included, then Appellee is entitled 
to share in 100% of Appellees' ownership. If only 40% of Appellant's cost is to be included, 
then in a like manner Appellee's share should be limited to a "proportional share" of 40% of 
Richards Street. 
K. Decisions required use of judgment 
The experts used their professional knowledge and "judgment" concerning a large 
number of matters to arrive at their conclusions, each decision of which materially affected 
the amount of damages. The Court exercised her judgment when she adopted Appellee's 
expert's conclusions,31 and as a result, prejudgment interest cannot be recovered. 
L. Waiver and estoppel arguments 
Appellee's argument32 that because the stipulation may have waived Appellants' right 
to a future dispute of the matters included in the stipulation, it somehow also acts as a waiver 
of Appellees' right to dispute imposition of interest before the stipulation, is frivolous. 
Waiver is a voluntary relinquishment of a known right. No such wavier occurred. Also, as 
demonstrated above, appellant's argument that the stipulation allegedly "did not stipulate to 
See f 6, P. 33 in Appellants' Opening Brief herein. 
P. 24-25 - without citation to authority. 
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material disputed issues of fact"33 is frivolous, as is his argument that, without the stipulation, 
after hearing evidence from both experts, the Court would have arrived at the same 
conclusions.34 
M. Alleged unworkable standard of mathematical accuracy 
A long series of cases have established specific rules which require "mathematical 
certainty" before prejudgment interest may be awarded. By their very nature, most complex 
commercial disputes lack the necessary "mathematical certainty" to permit prejudgment 
interest. Appellants have merely applied the facts to the law. Appellee's argument should 
be addressed to the legislature, not to the Court. Contrary to Appellee's argument [P. 28], 
the fact that Appellants reported income from the Las Vegas Project on their income tax 
returns does not establish the amount of their liability to Appellee with "mathematical 
certainty." To the contrary, as demonstrated above, in Ex. 140, the experts made substantial 
changes to the information on the income tax returns to determine the amount due to 
Appellee. 
III. APPELLEE'S ASSERTION THAT THIS APPEAL IS DEFICIENT BECAUSE 
THE APPELLANTS' FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE IS ERRONEOUS. 
There is no substantial evidence to marshal. No evidence was adduced at trial that 
supports Appellee's position. Appellee points to Factual Findings which he drafted and 
33
 Brief of Appellee P. 28. 
34
 BriefofAppelleeP.27. 
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presented to the trial court as evidence that the trial court ruled correctly. Over objections 
by the Appellants, the trial court approved its contents. The Appellee now points to the 
Findings and Conclusions as evidence the trial court ruled correctly. However, he does not 
point to any substantive evidence that draws one to this conclusion. Appellee points to 
documentation that he argues supports his position. However, it is nothing but the contrary. 
The trial court failed to apply the Stipulation logically, giving no deference to the Appellants' 
proper cost basis and seven (7) offsets listed in the Stipulation. These items were to be 
considered by the trial court. Further, evidence was produced by the Appellants that 
supported their claim of offsets, and their basis in the property.35 Without evidence to the 
contrary, the trial court did not take this basis into consideration when making its ruling. All 
other items, including base selling price and the costs incurred by the other partners, were not 
considered by the trial court, but yet it gave Appellee a full share of the partnership interest. 
Under the Stipulation this court should consider whether the trial court applied the stipulation 
correctly. 
The Appellee, in his Sections III, IV and V of Brief of Appellee, essentially argued 
that the court correctly ruled when it determined that (1) the parties had entered into a valid 
contract, (2) various misrepresentations made by the Appellants constituted fraud, (3) that 
prejudgement interest ran from the time of Appellee's investment, and (4) that the Appellants 
See Record, 1589, pages 462-82. 
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did not meet the appropriate burden of proof regarding their offsets.36 In making these 
determinations, the trial court relied heavily on the Stipulation entered into in open court by 
the parties. The issues on appeal before this court are based on that stipulation.37 In 
such a case this Court does not apply the clearly erroneous standard, but will sustain the trial 
court's decision only if convinced of its correctness.38 This court addresses a purely legal 
question: did the trial court apply the stipulation properly? Appellee argues that the issues 
before this court simply challenge the factual findings devised by the trial court.39 In the 
instant case, the parties entered into a Stipulation at trial.40 The Stipulation gave parameters 
within which the trial court was to base its conclusions.41 
The Appellee argues this Court should grant considerable deference to the trial court's 
findings in the instant case. Appellee points to case law that acknowledges this rule of law. 
It is the Appellants' position, however, that the Appellants do not need to "marshal the 
evidence," but have nevertheless specifically identified the challenged factual findings of the 
trial court. Appellants' Brief stands on its own merits. 
36
 See Record, 1347-1353. 
37
 For a discussion on the proper standard of review when a trial court applies a stipulation to its ruling 
see "Correct Standard of Review" above. 
38
 Bess v. Jensen, 782 P.2d 542, 544 (Utah App. 1989). 
39
 See Brief of Appellee, page 30. 
40
 See Record 1590, Tr. 595-598. 
41
 Id. 
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IV. THE APPELLEE CLAIMS THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED THE 
STIPULATED AMOUNTS CORRECTLY IS ERRONEOUS 
Appellee argues the trial court correctly applied the stipulation amounts.42 Appellee 
asserts there was insufficient evidence to support the Appellants' claim that the offsets should 
be taken into consideration when determining damages. Appellee contends that because the 
trial court found in his favor, then it must be so. Appellants argue, however, that the trial 
court was wrong in its analysis; that Appellants met the burden of proof substantiating these 
offsets. These offsets were included within the Stipulation, and presented to the court for its 
to determination. The trial court universally rejected all offsets. For the Court's benefit, 
these offsets are as follows: (1) buyout of the three original partners ($665,019), (2) 
commissions to individuals, Hansen and Bova ($8,596), (3) buyout of Dubois, an additional 
partner($ 13,845), (4) buyout of Daines and Hansen, additional partners ($33,870), (5) general 
and administrative expenses (ranging from $5,951 to $17,287), (6) check given to Lefavi by 
Bertoch ($32,182), (7) amounts paid to Lefavi from stock profits to cover Lefavi's shortfall 
in the project($36,693), and (8) over-payment to Lefavi on stock transactions by Bertoch, 
($ 17,022).43 Instead of re-arguing the basis for Appellants' position regarding these offsets, 
See Brief of Appellee, pages 32-34. 
43
 See Appendix "D" of Corrected Brief of Appellants for copy of Trial Exhibit 140 which details the 
Stipulation. 
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the Court is respectfully directed to the Corrected Brief of Appellant.44 The trial court failed 
to allow any of these amounts as credits. The evidence produced at trial indicates these 
offsets should have been considered in determining the judgment amount. 
V. THE APPELLEE'S CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL COURT 
PROPERLY DETERMINED LEFAVI'S PROPORTIONAL SHARE IS 
ERRONEOUS. 
Appellee asserts that the lower court came to the proper conclusion based on the 
facts before the court. The trial court ignored evidence that reduced Appellee's interest in 
the project. The trial court awarded Appellee a partnership interest in the project (which 
increased the damage award), without taking into consideration uncontroverted evidence that 
Appellants made payments to third parties, to Appellee, and incurred administrative 
expenses, all of which should have reduced the amount owed to Appellee. These credits 
include commissions paid to Hansen and Bova, buyouts of Dubois, Daines and Nelson, 
amounts paid to Appellee from stock transactions and administrative expenses.45 These 
amounts were not taken into consideration by the trial court in determining the damage 
award.46 
See Corrected Brief of Appellant, pages 22-49. 
45
 See Appendix "D" of Corrected Brief of Appellants for copy of Trial Exhibit 140 which details the 
Stipulation. 
46
 See Corrected Brief of Appellant, pages 22-49. 
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The Trial court erred in determining Lefavi's project percentage amount. 
During trial, the parties' expert witnesses stipulated to the gross investments of the parties 
in the project. As part of the Stipulation, the accountants agreed that Appellants' share of the 
investment was between $1,440,368 and $2,105,387, and as a result, Appellee's share of the 
proceeds was between 5.27% and 3.39%. However, the accountants failed to take into 
consideration Appellee's investment of $68,875, increasing the total investment amount of 
the parties to $1,509,243 and $2,174,262 respectively. The error in the Stipulation was 
pointed out to the trial court by Appellants. The court chose to ignore the computing error. 
The trial court selected the higher amount, i.e. 5.27%, in determining the amount 
owed to Appellee. Assuming for arguendo, the lower court was right in applying the higher 
percentage, the applicable percentage should have been 4.56%. That is, 4.56% of the total 
investment of the parties instead of 5.27% of the Appellants' investment. 
($68,875/$ 1,509,243=4.56%). 
VI. THE APPELLEE'S CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY 
APPLIED THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES BASED ON ITS FINDINGS IS 
ERRONEOUS 
The trial court erred in not allowing evidence of an offset of proceeds received 
by Appellee from Appellants regarding stock transactions between the parties. As 
previously discussed, even though evidence the Appellants were entitled to offsets, and 
notwithstanding the adverse inference from Appellee having asserted his Fifth Amendment 
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privilege, the trial court ruled Appellants had not met their burden of proof. Appellee did not 
present evidence disputing Appellants' claim to these offsets, but the trial court did not allow 
the credit. 
The trial court refused to take into consideration factual evidence Appellants 
presented at trial. This evidence should substantially reduce the proportional share to which 
the Appellee was entitled. 
This appeal concerns, inter alia, the trial court's ruling embodied in its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law prepared by Appellee counsel. Appellee has made bald 
statements that Appellants have not marshaled the evidence.47 Appellee has failed to cite to 
the record supporting this allegation. It is Appellants' position that based on the evidence 
derived at trial the trial court erred in its decision. 
In 1975 Bertoch and Poulsen acquired a portion of an investment property in Las 
Vegas, Nevada, near the airport.48 This interest was transferred into Richards Street 
Development in 1976,49 and then in 1982 was transferred into the name of Russell Road 
Development.50 As of 1978 the Las Vegas property consisted of (3) parcels of real estate, 
See Brief of Appellee, pg. 30. 
See Record 1479, Finding 2. 
See Record 1479, Finding 3. 
See Record 1479, Finding 4. 





known as Lots 8, 10 and ll.51 In 1978 Bertoch and Appellee entered into an agreement 
whereby Appellee would invest in the project.52 It is disputed as to when Poulsen became 
aware of Appellee's interest in the project. Poulsen testified he was unaware of the 
investment until 1983 when Lot 10 was sublet to an individual, Gilbert Sellan.53 It was also 
disputed at trial whether Appellee ever had an interest in Poulsen's share. However, the 
parties stipulated that Appellee had an interest in the whole.54 It was also stipulated at trial 
that Lefavi invested a total of $68,875.55 These Findings, though superceded by Exhibit 140, 
establish the Appellants had invested substantial personal funds in the project. 
In an effort to shorten the trial, and narrow the issues, the parties stipulated that 
Lefavi would share in Bertoch and Poulsen's interest in the Las Vegas Property. During trial, 
evidence was produced that mitigated damages. This evidence included witness testimony 
and documentation that determined expenses andpro rata shares of the individual investors 
of the project, which reduced the Appellants' share of the project, and increased their 
51
 See Record 1479, Finding 5. 
52
 See Record 1479, Finding 6-7. 
53
 See Record 1589, Tr. 423. See also, Record 1588, Tr. 217. 
54
 See Appendix "A" attached to Appellant's Brief for copy of Stipulation marked as Trial Exhibit 140. 
55
 (a) Id. (b) See Record 1479, Finding 9-10. Note that Finding 8, 11 and 12 were superceded by the 
Stipulation, Exhibit 140 whereby Lefavi's interest in the property was established at $68,875. 
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expenses.56 Further, unrefuted evidence demonstrated (1) that cost items increased 
Appellants cost of the project (which in turn, reduced its profit),57 (2) the amount decreasing 
Appellants' cost of purchasing the 3/4 interest in the original partnership, (3) cash payments 
made to Appellee by Bertoch offsetting the amount due to the Appellee, and (4) stock 
payment made to Appellee by Bertoch. The end result grossly inflated, and unfairly 
increased, the amount awarded to Appellee. It gave Appellee the best of both worlds. 
Appellee expects he should be given the benefit of his investment (which was 
stipulated to by the parties during trial), without incurring any of the costs incurred by his 
partners in acquiring that investment. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellee is incorrect in his assessment that the trial court ruled properly. 
The evidence adduced at trial did not support it's rulings. The stipulation was 
incorrectly employed, prejudgment interest was incorrectly applied, and damages 
were awarded without supporting evidence. The trial court has refused to correct 
mathematical, legal and factual errors. 
See Record 1587, Tr. 59, also Record 1328, Exhibits 6 and 9 offered and received. These agreements 
provided that Lefavi received a proportional interest in the project. 
57
 See Record 1588, Tr.265, see also Record 1328, Exhibit 76 offered and received. This printout shows 
the payments made by the Appellants as of July, 1983. 
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Therefore, this matter should be remanded, and/or the judgment should be 
reduced and corrected. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, effective this Z&^ day of July, 1999. 
C 
Ronald C. Barker 
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that on the2&^-day of July, 1999,1 caused to be mailed two 
true and correct copies of the following, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Douglas E. Griffith, Esq. 
KESLER & RUST 
36 South State Street, Suite 2000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
A U ^ - ^ X <L. ^ £ ^ C 
Ronald C. Barker 





1. All income shown on the tax returns was received. 
(It is my experience that individuals do not overstate income as they do not wish to pay taxes on phantom 
income.) 
2. All expenses incurred in the production of income are reported on the tax returns. 
(To do otherwise would result in an overpayment of taxes.) 
3. There were three sales of the Las Vegas Property. 
a. Gilbert D. Sellan 
b. Clark County 
c. Las Vegas Properties 
(Mr. Poulson reported sales on July 3, 1986 & Nov. 4, 1988 separately but I believe these were related 
to the three sales shown above.) 
4. The Russell Road Partnership Agreement showing ownership & profit sharing percentages of 25% each to 
Mr. Bertoch & Mr. Poulson and 50% to DASCO, Inc. is correct. 
5. Mr. LeFavi contributed $68,875 as he contends and as shown on Mr. Bertoch's letter of February 18, 1992. 
NOTES 
Note 1 - Mr. Bertoch & Mr. Poulson reported different sales prices and cost basis on the sale of property to Gilbert 
D. Sellan. I did not have sufficient information to make a determination as to why this occurred. The selling 
prices reported on the tax returns do not equal 25% of the selling price reported on the sales documents. 
Neither Mr. Poulson nor Mr. Bertoch reported any collection on the Note received in connection with this sale 
of property. However, Mr. Poulson did report the sale of some of the property which collateralized the note on 
his 1986 tax return. (See Note 3) Mr. Dudley A. Smith, Pres. of DASCO, INC., reported that Mr. Sellan 
defaulted on the note and Russell Road foreclosed on the property collateralizing the note. Mr. Smith indicated, 
in a memo to Mr. LeFavi, that the property received was subsequently sold for more than the $670,000 due on 
the note. The sale reported by Mr. Poulson on Nov. 4, 1988 may also represent a portion of the sale of those 
properties. (See Note 4) 
Note 2 - Selling prices reported on the tax returns do equal the ownership & profit sharing percentages on the RR 
partnership agreement. Mr. Bertoch did not provide a copy of Form 6252 with his tax return, however, the gain 
shown on his schedule D is the same as reported by Mr. Poulson. I have, therefore, made the assumption that 
Mr. Bertoch's Form 6252 is the same as Mr. Poulson's. 
Mr. Poulson reported a collection on the note received from Clark County in 1988, Mr. Bertoch did not report 
any subsequent collections. Mr. Poulson did not report collection of the full 25%, however, his gross profit 
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NOTES - Continued 
Note 3 - The sale of November 4, 1988 is shown only on Mr. Poulson's Form 1040 Schedule D. The sale is in the 
amount of $290,000and covers lots 13, 16, & 17 in Vista Del Sol. These parcels were shown as collateral for 
the Sellen note in the amount of $670,000received 6-1-83 (See Note 1). The CPA's working for RRDC reported 
these land sales as additional properties acquired by RRDC in 1981. Their report dated 3-02-89 appears to be 
in error on that point. 
Note 4 - The sale of November 4, 1998 is shown only on Mr. Poulson's Form 1040 Schedule D. The sale was 
apparently reported to him in a letter from Conway, Fair, Stuart, & Woodbury (CPA's for RRDC at the time) 
on their report dated July 14, 1987. They reported these land sales as additional properties acquired by RRDC 
in 1981. I did not see any sales documents relating to this sale. They may also be for properties acquired by 
RRDC on 6-1-83 collateralizing the Sellen Note. 
Note 5 - The sale to Las Vegas Resort Investments was escrowed in 1988 and Stock was transferred to Mr. Bertoch 
& Mr. Poulson shortly thereafter. The sale was reported on Mr. Bertoch's and Mr. Poulson's return as of January 
1989. Mr. Poulson's 1989 return provided me was incomplete, however, the capital gain shown on Schedule D 
was in the same amount as reported on Mr. Bertoch's return and so I have made the assumption that Mr. 
Poulson's Form 6252 is the same as Mr. Bertoch's. When the trust deed note was collected in 1991, the collection 
of the cash was reported by both individuals. Mr. Poulson changed the Gross Profit percentage on his form 
6252 from that shown on the 1989 return of Mr. Bertoch. 
The value of the stock received in 1989 was not reported for the same amount shown on the escrow statement 
at the time of sale. Escrow statement values Stock at $ .05/share and tax returns show a value of $ .005/share. 
I do not have sufficient information to determine how the stock value shown on the returns was calculated. 
Note 6 - Sales prices are taken from the original Form 6252 filed for each sale in the year of sale. Collection of the 
note received from Mr. Sellan was never identified on any of the returns, however, Mr. Dudley Smith's note and 
the amounts reported by Mr. Poulson in 1986 and 1988 (See Note 3) indicate that at least the $670,000 was 
received. 
Note 7 - Cost basis is taken from the original Form 6252 filed for each sale in the year of sale. As reflected in my 
2nd assumption, this amount should include all expenses related to the property. 
Cost basis should not include interest paid by Bertoch & Poulson if the interest is on loans taken out by them 
to carry their share of the project. Mr. LeFavi has added no opportunity cost to the amount contributed by him 
which would be the equivalent of interest paid to carry his share of the project. 
At the closing of the Clark County Sale, a loan was obtained from Valley Bank in the amount of $ 1,762,000. 
Interest paid on this note should have been offset by interest paid by Clark County on their Trust Deed Note of 
$ 2,262,000from the same sale. 
Note 8 - 1 was not provided with any information relative to interest paid by Mr. Sellan on his Trust Deed note prior 
to default nor was I provided with detail relative to interest paid by Clark County on their $ 2,262,000 note or 
by Las Vegas Resort Investments on their $ l,432,500trust deed note. However, interest income on the July 14, 
1987 letter from RRDC accountants is almost identical to interest expenses for the year 1986 and is greater than 
the interest expense for 1987 on the accountants letter of July 25,1988. RRDC reported income from managing 
the Las Vegas Properties in both 1986 and 1987 and Mr. Lefavi may be entitled to share in this income from the 
property as well. 
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SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF SALB 4 COLLECTONS - LAS VEGAS PROPERTE5 PREPARED: JUNE 2 0 . 1 9 9 6 
LEFAV1 VS. BERTOCH/POULSON 







€ 1 . 19B3 
SALES PRICE 
CASH RECEIVED 
SALE TO GLBERT D SELLAN 4.24 ACRES 
1. 870 . 000.00 
1 . 2 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 
NOTE RECEIVED 
GAIN ON TAX RETURNS 
670. 000.00 









1 6 2 . 7 1 3 . 0 0 55 .31% 
SEE NOTE f 1 
414. 018 .00 22.14% PRFT/SHR % 
255. 6B0.00 22.14% PRFT/SHR % 
0.00 




SALE TO CLARK COUNTY 8 .5 ACRES 
2. 962. 000.00 
700. 000.00 
NOTE RECEIVED 
GAIN ON TAX RETURNS 
2. 262 . 000.00 
17B. 500.00 






740 . 500.00 
175. 000 .00 
0.00 





SEE NOTE f 2 
740. 500 .00 
1 7 5 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 
B9. 250.00 
1 1 5 . 3 6 2 . 0 0 
25.00% PRFT/Stft % 
25.00% PRFT/SHR % 
2 2 6 . 2 0 0 . 0 0 10.00% PRFT/SHR % 
51.00% GRSSPRFT% 
51.00% GRSSPRFT% 



















SEE NOTE * 3 
173. 234 .00 100.00% PRFT/SHR % 
1 7 3 . 2 3 4 . 0 0 100.00% PRFT/SHR % 
0.00 
44. 3BB.00 25.62% GRSS PRFT% 


















SEE NOTE * 4 
7 2 . 5 0 0 . 0 0 100.00% PRFT/SH* % 
7 2 . 5 0 0 . 0 0 100.00% PRFT/SHR % 
0.00 
1 4 . 3 0 3 . 0 0 19.73% GRSS PRFT% 




SALE TO LAS VEGAS RESORT INVESTMENTS 4.385 
2. 865 . 000.00 
0.00 
1 . 4 3 2 . 5 0 0 . 0 0 
NOTE RECEIVED 
GAN ON TAX RETURNS 
GAN ON TAX RETURNS 
1. 432 .500 .00 
55. 296.00 

















SEE NOTE f 5 
393. 938.00 13.75% PRFT/SHR % 
0.00 
35. 813.00 2.50% PRFT/SHR % 
35B. 125.00 25.00% PRFT/SHR % 
27. 648.00 77.20% 




SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF SALES. COSTS. 4 CANS - LAS VEGAS PROPERTES 
LEFAVI VS. BERTOCH/POULSON 
PREPARED: JUNE 2 0 . 1 9 9 6 
€ REALIZED ON SALES OF LAS VEGAS PROPERTY - BASED ON WORMATON REPORTED ON NDMDUAL TAX RETURNS. 
SALES PRICES REPORTED ON RETURNS 
JUNE 1 . 1 9 8 3 
MARCH 2 8 . 1 9 8 5 








450. 296 .00 
740. 500 .00 




414 . 01B.00 
7 4 0 . 500.00 
3 9 3 . 93B.00 




B64. 314 .00 
, 4 8 1 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 
7 8 7 . B76.00 
133 . 190.00 
SEE NOTE f 6 
COST BASE REPORTED ON RETURNS 
JUNE 1 . 19B3 
MARCH 2B. 1985 
DECEMBER 2 0 . 1988 
GANS REPORTED ON ORIGINAL FORMS 6252 
BRUCES CONTRBUTDN 
TOTAL BASS REPORTED 





1 9 6 . 7 4 6 . 0 0 
3 6 2 . 7 7 2 . 0 0 
B9. 826 .00 
649. 344 .00 
1B4. 923.00 
3 6 2 . 7 7 2 . 0 0 
8 9 . 8 2 6 . 0 0 






3. 133. 190.00 
5.35% 













LESS: GAIN FROM STOCK RECEIVED ( 1 . 4 3 2 . 500 SHRS • $ .005) 
3. 133. 190.00 
5.35% 
1 6 7 . 6 9 3 . 1 6 
(7. 162.50) 




ADDITDNAL AMOUNT DUE 160 . 530 .66 306. 156.50 
BRUCE LEFAVl - NTEREST DUE 
RATE 










1, 481r 000.00 
787, 876.00 















1, 846 ,325 .00 







































































































7 1 , 625.00 
78, 787.60 
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APPENDIX 3 
through the schedule and identify the items that we do agree 
on. 
THE COURT: I think that would be helpful. 
MR. GRIFFITH: So the Court can make whatever 
notes it deems appropriate. We probably should make the 
schedule as an exhibit and then --
THE COURT: Let's do that. What's the next 
exhibit number? 
MR. BARKER: He has marked them already as No. 
400. 
THE COURT: Who has? 
MR. BARKER: Mr. Townsend put same numbers on 
them. 
THE COURT: Let's see. Now we're letting our 
witnesses mark our exhibits. 
MR. BARKER: He asked me if I -
THE COURT: No. It's not going to happen. We're 
going to use our own exhibit numbers, and we'll put our own 
exhibit tag on. I guess we could have anybody mark them, 
but that isn't how we operate. Let's see. Do we have 92 or 
284? Is that our next one? 
THE CLERK: No, I show either 366 or the --
MR. BARKER: There are 15 schedules. 
THE COURT: For the defendant or either 140 for 
the plaintiff. 
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THE CLERK: Either 140 for the plaintiff or 366. 
THE COURT: Let's go with 140. All right. 140 is 
the nuiriber for this first one. Let's move along, if we 
could. 140, if we could have it, we'll mark it. So that's 
a one page exhibit? Is it a two page exhibit? 
MR. BARKER: Mr. Townsend? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
MR. BARKER: Two pages? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Let's staple them together, Michelle, 
and mark them 140. 
MR. BARKER: Okay. Mr. Townsend, would you came 
forward, then, and walk us through this? 
THE COURT: Then, 140 is going to be received by 
stipulation, is that correct, Counsel? 
MR. BARKER: That's correct. 
MR. GRIFFITH: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: It's received. We marked it with a 
real exhibit tag, and I have the original. Is there a copy 
for me? 
MR. GRIFFITH: We'll hand that to the witness. 
Apparently there isn't --
THE WITNESS: Would you make a copy, Kerry, for me 
to utilize and we'll utilize -- we'll make one. Take the 
stand, if you would, sir. 
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MR. BARKER: He has an extra copy he just handed 
to us. 
THE COURT: We'll make one. Let's get on with 
it. 
REMON BRAD TOWNSEND, 
called as a witness on behalf of the defendant, being duly 
sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BARKER: 
THE COURT: All right. You may proceed. 
Q Would you state your name, please? 
A Remon, R-E-M-O-N, Brad Townsend. 
Q Where do you reside? 
A 2785 South 2700 East, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Q What is your occupation? 
A I'm a certified public accountant. 
Q And are you with a firm? 
A Yes. 
Q What is it? 
A Norman Loebdecke Associates. 
Q How long have you been a CPA? 
THE COURT: Can we get a spelling on the last name 
mentioned in the title? 
THE WITNESS: L-O-E-B-D-E-C-K-E. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
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Q (By Mr. Barker) How long have you been a 
certified public accountant? 
A Approximately eight years. 
Q What degrees do you have and from where? 
A I have a Bachelor of Science in accounting from 
the University of Utah. I have a master's of business 
administration also from the University of Utah. 
Q And does your practice consist primarily of 
litigation support? 
A More or less 50 to 70 percent would be that type 
of work. 
Q Now, you and Mr. Foerster have met together today, 
have you not? 
A Yes. 
Q And as a result of your meeting, you have 
generated a document that's been marked as Exhibit 140 and 
received into evidence by stipulation. Will you explain to 
the Court in detail what you did, what these figures mean, 
and the results of your conference? 
A Yes, except I need a copy of it. 
THE COURT: Well, it's supposed to be made. 
Michelle, would you ask Kerry if he's ready? It shouldn't 
take that long to copy two pages. 
THE CLERK: It's not working. 
THE COURT: If the copier works, yeah. 
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THE COURT: All right. Apparently, there is some 
kind of copy to utilize. 
MR. BARKER: Could you put a number on that, 
please? 
THE COURT: Is this the next? 
MR. BARKER: No, that's the same number. 
THE WITNESS: I just need a copy. 
MR. BARKER: Okay. Fine. 
THE WITNESS: I think this is the Court's copy. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
MR. GRIFFITH: Your Honor, do you have a copy? 
THE COURT: I have a copy of one page. 
MR. GRIFFITH: Do you want to staple that and give 
that to the Court? 
THE COURT: Thank you. You may proceed. 
Q (By Mr. Barker) Tell us which page you're 
referring to, first, if you would, please. 
A I'm referring to the first page of this exhibit. 
I don't recall the number. 
THE COURT: 140. 
A 140. This is a summary of what I would refer to 
as tax return method of calculating damages in this case. 
Over lunch break Mr. Foerster and I met together and 
discussed the differences in our measurement of damages, and 
we identified -- excuse me. We identified seven items that 
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seem to be disputed facts that affected our damage 
calculations. Outside of those seven items, we agreed for 
the most part to methodology that should be used in 
calculating damages in the case. 
Q Now, does this assume that Mr. Lefavi is involved 
for all properties? 
A Yes, it does. The first issue that we had to deal 
with in preparing a schedule --
Q Perhaps I can interrupt one more time, if I 
could. Yesterday we had some schedules of payments to 
various people that there was some objection to, and same 
items that had limited foundation. Did you prepare a 
revised schedule? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q And were those revised schedules used by yourself 
and by Mr. Foerster in computing these amounts? 
A Yes, they were. 
Q Thank you. Go ahead. 
A Okay. In the first page of this exhibit in the 
upper section, in Columns B and C, we measured what we refer 
to as the amount unpaid before disputed credits, which is 
seen on line 10. Line 10 I would characterize as measuring 
the amounts due Mr. Lefavi based on the gross sales price of 
the properties before consideration of disputed issues in 
the case. 
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We calculated a maximum and a minimum based on 
consideration of whether or not the Court determined that 
amounts paid to Mr. Hansen and Mr. Bova should be considered 
as costs in acquiring the properties in this case, whether 
or not the buy-out of Mr. Paul Dubois should be considered 
as a cost in acquiring the properties, and whether or not 
the buy-outs of Mr. Daines and Mr. Nelson, as testified by 
the plaintiff, should be considered as a cost in measuring 
the basis in the case. 
Q Now, are those the items on 11, Lines 11, 12, and 
13? 
A Yes, they are. 
Q Perhaps it would be more clear if you would start 
at the top with Line 1 and explain each item. 
A Okay. Line 1 shows what we agreed was the share 
of the adjusted selling price that was in our opinion the 
right of the combined interests of Mr. Bertoch, Mr. Poulson, 
Mr. Lefavi, based on 50 percent of the sales price of the 
properties in the Las Vegas project. The calculation of the 
3,203,875 is seen in more detail on the second page of this 
exhibit in Lines 1 through 3. It's simply a restatement of 
the reportings from the tax returns with one small 
adjustment for the fact that there had not been a full 50 
percent reported on the tax returns. 
The item in line No. 2 on page --on the first 
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page of Exhibit 140 has an addition for the net benefit from 
a sublease to Mr. Sellan on a portion of what has been 
referred to as the land property in this case. And we 
determined that the net benefit from the sublease to 
Mr. Poulson and Mr. Bertoch was a combined $96,158. That 
amount was added to the gross selling price on the 
properties to compensate for that component of compensation 
or return of investment to Bertoch and Poulson. 
On Line 3 of the first page we then subtract the 
adjusted share of the purchase price, which is calculated on 
the second page of this document in the middle section, in 
the middle and lower section. And perhaps we can go through 
that in a little more detail once we have covered the front 
page. 
On Line 5 we have itemized Mr. Lefavi's percentage 
of gross investment based on different assumptions with 
regards to the disputed items, itemized in Line Nos. 11, 12 
and 13 on page 1 of the exhibit. Under the minimum damage 
base scenario, the percentage is 3.49 percent, and under the 
maximum damage base scenario it's 5.27 percent. 
Q Now, does that mean, Mr. Townsend, that if the 
Hansen, Bova, Dubois and Daines and Nelson items were not 
included as part of the Bertoch Poulson cost, that the 
percentage changes from 3.49 to 5.27? 
A That's correct. 
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Q Proceed. 
A On Lines 7 and 8 of this exhibit we then add --
well, let me back up. Line 6 is a calculation of Mr. 
Lefavi's interest in the profits from the sales of these 
properties. Line 6 is a calculation based on the 
multiplication of Line 4 times Line 5. Under the minimum 
damage base, that calculation comes to 41,693. Under the 
maximum damage base, that calculation comes to 98,004. 
We then add to those amounts Mr. Lefavi's 
investment in the project on line --
Q You have used a larger amount as the 68, rather 
than the 58, have you? 
A Yes. We have used 68,875. 
Q Thank you. 
A Line 8 itemizes Mr. Lefavi's total interest in the 
sales proceeds from the projects under a minimum calculation 
of 110,569 and a maximum calculation of $166,880. We then 
subtracted from the amount of his interest in the gross 
proceeds from the sales the value of the stock that he 
received, which was calculated based on 5 mills per share, 
which totals $7,163, to calculate the minimum. The maximum 
damage base, as seen on line 10, final amount unpaid before 
disputed credits of 103,406 under the minimum damage base, 
and $159,717 under the maximum damage base. 
The next section of Exhibit 1 shows a 
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reconciliation of the two damage base items, as I discussed 
earlier, on 11 -- on lines 11 through 13, which would allow 
the Court to make a determination as to the damage base, 
depending upon which of those elements were included or were 
not included as an investment by the defendants. 
Q Do I understand your testimony, then, to be that 
if the Court should determine that the commissions to Hansen 
and Bova were not properly allowable, then the 159, --or 
excuse me. The 103,000 would be increased by another 
$8,596? 
A That's correct. 
Q And that's true of each of those items, is it not? 
A Yes. If the Court determined that the commissions 
to Hansen and Bova were allowable and the buy-out of Dubois 
was allowable, that the buy-out of Daines and Nelson was not 
allowable, then the minimum damage base would have added to 
it $33,870, as seen in Line 13. 
Q Thank you. Go ahead. 
A The lower section shown in lines 14 through 17 
entitled "Effect of additional fact disputes" value the 
financial impact on the calculations based on whether or not 
there is a -- well, based on the finding of fact with regard 
to these issues. So on Line 14 we see general and 
administrative expenses, and depending on which damage base 
is selected from Line 10, the GNA administrative expenses 
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could be measured by looking at Line 14. 
So, for example, if the Court determined the 
damage base was 103,406, and that general and administrative 
expenses were an acceptable expenditure, then there would be 
a reduction of $5,951. If it were determined the 
appropriate damage base was $159,717, then the general and 
administrative expenses increases, based on the formula, to 
$17,287. 
Q So that amount would be deducted if that amount is 
allowed; is that correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q That is, the amount on Line 14 would be deducted 
from the amount on Line 10 if general and administrative 
expenses are allowable expense? 
A Yes. 
Q All right. 
A Should the Court determine that Line 15, which is 
Check No. 1148, which was a $32,182 payment to Mr. Lefavi 
was in fact a return of his investment, then that amount 
would be subtracted. 
Q Now, discuss that for a moment. Supposing the 
Court were to determine, as argued by Mr. Griffith, at least 
by implication, that that might have been a payment on 
stock. Would that increase the amount of paid for stock as 
an offset by that amount? 
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A It would, depending on whose funds bought the 
stock. 
Q Okay. 
A Line 16 shows the amount paid to Mr. Lefavi from 
stock profits to cover principal shortfall in the 
investment/ as claimed by the defendants. So if it were 
determined that that was in fact an agreement between the 
parties, that amount would be deducted from the damages. 
Q And how is that amount calculated? 
A Generally that amount was calculated, based on the 
agreement between Mr. Lefavi and Mr. Bertoch, as testified 
to by Mr. Bertoch, that the stock transactions at issue in 
this case were entered into in order to return a principal 
investment shortfall to Mr. Lefavi. 
Q And is this amount, then, the difference 
between -- I should state it another way. Is this the 
amount of Mr. Lefavi's investment, less the 32,182? 
A Yes, it is. 
Q And so that portion, the 32,182 plus the 36,693, 
if those two items are allowed, they reimburse him his 
original investment; is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q Thank you. Go ahead. 
A The Line Item No. 17 that's entitled overpayment 
to Lefavi on stock transactions is an amount that was 
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determined to be an amount overpaid to Mr. Lefavi on the 
stock transaction based on the assumption that the agreement 
between the parties was as outlined by Mr. Bertoch. 
Q Now, I note that you haven't came up with a final 
figure as to the amount that would be owed if those expenses 
are all allowed. Have you made that computation? 
A I have not. 
Q But the computation -- how would it be computed? 
A Once it were determined which damage base on Line 
10 was most appropriate to be used, then the Court could 
start with that damage base, and to the extent these other 
disputed credits, as Mr. Foerster and I refer to them, are 
allowable, they would be subtracted from that damage base. 
Q And the difference would be the amount owed; is 
that correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q Did you have any further discussions on page 2? 
A In the middle section of page 2, Lines 4 through 
15, with the heading "purchase price," we calculated the 
purchase price or basis of the projects, which is carried 
over to Line No. 3 of the front page, using two different 
assumptions. One assumption was that the tax basis would 
need to be adjusted for certain costs, such as taxes, 
revenue, stamps, closing costs, certain interest payments 
out of the closing proceeds from the sales of the 
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properties. Those amounts total down Line 15 at 
$1,440,367,95, which represents what we calculated as the 
tax basis under the maximum damage calculation. 
The amount from Column B on Line 15 carries over 
to Column C on Line 3 of page 1. We then applied the effect 
of commissions paid to Hansen and Bova, as claimed by the 
defendants, and the claimed purchases of partnership 
interest from Dubois, Daines and Nelson, as claimed by the 
defendants, to came up with a tax basis under the minimum 
damage base of $2,105,387. That amount is also carried over 
on to the first page and is seen on Line 3 -- or, yes, Line 
3 in Column B. 
In the lower section entitled Lefavi percentage 
interest in gross investment --
Q This is still on page 2? 
A Yes, this is page 2, I'm sorry. On line 20 we 
calculated his percentage interest under the maximum damage 
base, assuming that he invested $68,875 and assuming that he 
shared pro rata in the costs paid out of escrow that are 
seen in Line 6 through 15 -- 6 through 14, line 21 is a 
calculation of Mr. Lefavi1 s percentage interest under the 
minimum damage base. Also assuming that he shared pro rata 
in the expenses shown in Line 7 through 14 that came from 
closing funds. 
Those percentages on Lines 20 and 21 of the second 
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page are carried over to Line 5 and can be seen in Columns B 
and C on Line 5 of the front page. 
Q Now, after --
A I probably should make one comment as well. On 
Lines 4, 6 and 8 there are some formulas that are noted 
incorrectly. Those were formulas that were left on from a 
model that Mr. Foerster and I started out with, and 
apparently I neglected to omit those. 
Q Should those be crossed off? 
A Yes, they should. And also on Line 15 --
Q Let's make that change now, if we may. 
THE COURT: That's four, six and eight, Counsel? 
MR. GRIFFITH: On the first page are we talking? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
MR. GRIFFITH: And are you talking about just the 
items in brackets? 
THE WITNESS: Just the bracketed items. 
THE COURT: All right. I'll strike those on my 
copy. 
A And I believe on the original Exhibit No. 140 on 
the front page on line 15 it should be written in that the 
amount of Check 1148 was 32/182, as opposed to the typed 
amount of 31/382. 
MR. BARKER: There is no dispute about that 
correction/ is there? 
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